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Smith: Smith: Torts--Products Liability--Strict Liability for Defect in Design
RECENT CASES

TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITYSTRICT LIABILITY FOR
DEFECT IN DESIGN
Blevins v. Cushman Motors'
Albert Blevins and his golfing partner were using a golf cart manufactured by the defendant Cushman Motors. While being turned in a
shady area of the golf course where a light dew was present, the golf
cart "skidded, tipped, and turned over." Blevins fell to the ground and
was pinned beneath the cart. Blevins sued Cushman Motors for personal
injuries on the theory of strict liability in tort for design defect. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Missouri heard
the case as if on original appeal and affirmed the judgment for Blevins.
The Blevins decision is significant for three reasons: the Missouri
Supreme Court adopted strict liability for design defects; the opinion
articulates the conceptual differences between strict liability and negligence; and although it adopts strict liability for design defects, the opinion fails to express clearly the standard to be used in determining
whether a product is defective.
Missouri first accepted the strict liability theory for defective products in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 2 following section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 Keener established that an action for strict liability in tort will lie to recover for injuries caused by a
product which is unreasonably dangerous as manufactured. The court in
Keener held that a product-based injury is actionable under section 402A
when the product is found to be defective and dangerous when put to a
4
use reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer.
1. 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
4. 445 S.W.2d at 366. It is interesting to note that in proposing the jury
instruction for use in Missouri products liability cases, the court departed from a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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It is important to distinguish between two types of product defects:
manufacturing defects and design defects. A manufacturing defect involves one particular product in which, through some malfunction of the
manufacturing process, there exists a defect. A design defect involves
the whole line of products and is the result of the manufacturer's choice
to adopt a particular design. Although Keener involved a design defect,
the court in that case did not distinguish between design defects and
manufacturing defects.
Relying on Keener, both the Missouri Court of Appeals 5 and the
federal Eighth Circuit 6 had applied the strict liability theory to design
defect cases prior to Blevins. These courts cited a leading California
case 7 which concluded that there is no rational distinction between design and manufacturing defects, as a product with a design defect may
be just as defective and dangerous as one with a manufacturing defect.,
In Blevins the Missouri Supreme Court approved this extension of Keener.
By recognizing a cause of action based on strict liability for design
defects, the court held that one need not prove negligence in such cases.
The distinction between strict liability and negligence was set out in Blevins: 9 strict liability deals with the dangerous condition of an article
which is designed in a particular way; negligence is concerned with the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in designing and selling the
product.10 Therefore, a product can have a degree of dangerousness
not tolerated under a strict liability theory even though the actions of the
designer were entirely reasonable and consequently not negligent, in
view of what he knew at the time he designed and sold the manufactured product." The imposition of liability in negligence cases is based
on the foreseeability or reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a

strict interpretation of the Restatement language. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 25.04
(1975 ed.) requires the jury to find only that a product was defective and therefore dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use. The court left out the
requirement that the product be unreasonably dangerous but did require that it
was put to a use reasonably anticipated. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dodlinger, 420
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Missouri law).
5. Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
6. Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying
Missouri law).
7. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970).
8. Id. at 475, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36.
9. 551 S.W.2d at 608, (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Ore.
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125
(1974).
10. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Ore. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033,
1037 (1974); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974).
11. Cases cited note 10 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/11
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likely result of acts or omissions,'1 2 whereas strict liability is based, in
part, on the foreseeable or reasonably anticipated use of a defective
13
product.

The difference between negligence and strict liability has been the
subject of much discussion. 14 Most writers seem to agree that the results
are usually the same under either theory. 15 Both involve a risk-utility
analysis; 16 the ultimate question is whether the manufacturer was
12. Taylor v. Hitt, 342 S.W.2d 489, 494 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Hull v.
Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 1236, 130 S.W.2d 623, 628 (1939).
13. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Mo. 1969).
14. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339

(1974); Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30
(1973); Keeton, Manufacturers Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855
(1963); Pope & Pope, Design Defect Cases: The Present State of Illinois Products Liability Law, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1975); Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectation"?, 22 Bus. LAW 589 (1967); Rheingold, Proof of
Defect in Products Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325 (1971); Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing FrameworkforAnalysis, 54 ORE. L. REv. 293 (1975); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automotive Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83;
Comment, Products Liability in Missouri: The Keener Complex, 42 U.M.K.C.L. REv.
187 (1973); Note, Products Liability-Defectiveness Standard of Section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts Questioned, 80 DICK. L. REv. 633 (1975); Note, Manufacturer's Liability for Design Defects, 56 NEB. L. REV. 422 (1977).

15. Wade, supra note 14, 44 Miss. L.J. at 836-37 stated:
In the case of improper design which makes the product dangerous,
whatever is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict liability
should apply (that it has a defective design, to use the Cronin approach), will also be enough to show negligence on the part of the
manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer is not aware of the danger
created by a bad design, he is negligent in not learning of it....
The proof necessary to establish strict liability will certainly be sufficient to establish negligence liability as well .... There are thus innate similarities between the actions in negligence and in strict liability, and changing the terminology does not alter this.
Keeton, supra note 14, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, is in accord.
16. Negligence principles require a balancing of the likelihood and gravity
of harm against the utility of the conduct and the burden imposed by precautions
which would be effective to avoid the harm. Larson v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See United States. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947) (classic negligence risk-utility balancing formula); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965) (risk-utility analysis); Note, supra
note 14, 56 NEB. L. REv. at 426. Wade, supra note 14, 44 Miss. L.J. at 837,
offered factors to be considered in the risk-utility analysis under strict liability
theory to determine defect:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and probable seriousness of the injury.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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reasonable in marketing the product as designed. Blevins seems to follow
a distinction recognized by Dean Keeton, namely, that the adoption of
strict liability principles eliminates the need to prove "that the manufacturer realized or should have realized in the exercise of ordinary care
the dangers involved in the product's use." 1 7 The focus is shifted from
the acts of the designer to the product itself, creating a "reasonable
product standard." ' 8 Keeton further theorized that under strict liability
the type of dangerous conduct required to subject the manufacturer to
liability is the same as is required for recovery on a negligence theory.
However, the fact that the manufacturer was excusably unaware of the
extent of the danger and had not committed any negligent act or omission would be entirely irrelevant.' 9 Consequently, although the designdefect plaintiff still must meet the burden of producing detailed technical evidence of design plans, specifications, and procedures 20 to make a
submissible case under a strict liability theory, he may prevail more
readily than under a negligence theory.
Another difference between the two theories relates to availability of
the contributory negligence defense. 2' This distinction often arises in
the so-called "second collision" cases, in which it is conceded that the
plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident, but it is argued that the

(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility ... of spreading the loss by setting the price of
the product or carrying liability insurance.
The difference in analysis is that under a negligence theory the focus is on
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions, whereas under a strict liability
analysis, the focus is on the condition of the product. See Green, Strict Liability
Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1210
(1976). See also Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The TechnologicalExpert in
Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303, 1307 n.20 (1974).
17. Keeton, supra note 14, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. at 565.
18. Note, supra note 14, 80 DICK. L. REv. at 636.
19. This, Keeton reasoned, would eliminate a number of difficult decision
points (presumably those involved in determining whether the plaintiff made a

submissible case), greatly simplify trials, and enhance the likelihood of settlements. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398,
407 (1970).

20. Powell & Hill, Proof of Defect and Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 77
(1975).
21. Whitford, supra note 14, at 124.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/11
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defect aggravated the injuries. 22 Contributory negligence is a complete
bar to the defendant's negligence liability in Missouri,2 3 but it is not a
complete defense to strict liability actions.2 4 Thus under a strict liability
theory, the defense of contributory negligence would not be available to
the manufacturer to provide insulation from liability in this type of case.
The imposition of strict liability in design defect cases will expand
the liability of manufacturers, yet this expanded liability does not place
the manufacturer in the position of an "insurer" of his products. It has
been held that the manufacturer has no duty to market a "foolproofi'
product. 25

The primary limitation on the manufacturer's liability is the

requirement that there be a defect in the product at the time it leaves the
manufacturer. 26 Missouri limits the manufacturer's liability by requiring
that the design be "defective and dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated" by the manufacturer.2 7 The crucial term is "defective."
Because this standard determines liability, the court should make clear
its meaning. Unfortunately, Blevins failed to clarify the law on this point.
It is instructive to examine the possible interpretations of the standard
for defect and the ramifications of each.
As previously noted, the court in Blevins reaffirmed its earlier adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A.2 8 It could be argued
that in doing so the court also adopted the Restatement test for determining the defectiveness of a product. The standard for defectiveness
set forth in the comments to the Restatement29 is the "consumer expecta22. Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 507
(1976); Larson v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
23. Henell v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929).
24. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 454 S.W.2d 611 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
25. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying Missouri law).
26. Keeton, supra note 14, 41 TEX. L. REV. at 858-59, cited in Markle v.
Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973).
27. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Mo. 1969).
28. 551 S.W.2d at 607.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in part:
Comment g. Defective condition.
The rule stated in this section applies only where the product is
at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him.... The seller is not liable when he delivers the
product in a safe condition and subsequent mishandling or other
causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed....
Comment h.
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling, and consumption.... If the injury results from
abnormal handling as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a
radiator to remove a cap, ... the seller is not liable....

Comment i. Unreasonably dangerous.
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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tions" test. Under this test, which evolved from principles of warranty,30
a product is defective if, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, it is in a,
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, and that condition is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 31 Recovery is precluded if the dangerous aspect of the product is generally known, 32 has
been adequately warned against,3 3 or is obvious. 34 It is difficult to argue
user or consumer.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics....
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products.
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified; notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions, and
warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.... The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are
properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequence attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
30. Warranty cases in Missouri prior to the acceptance of strict liability in tort
incorporated a consumer expectations test as to fitness. Paton v. Buick Motor
Div., 401 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1966); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963). The Missouri court in Morrow first accepted an
implied warranty theory without the need to show privity to establish strict liability of the manufacturer, i.e., it extended the food cases to nonfood manufactured
products. This case was the forerunner to strict tort liability in Missouri. Baker v.
Stewart Sand & Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961); Cohagan v.
Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958); Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 354 Mo.
1147, 193 S.W.2d 581 (1946); La Plant v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 346
S.W.2d 231 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961); Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241
Mo. App. 1057, 253 S.W.2d, 532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952); Lawson v. Benjamin
Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Spr. Mo. App. 1944). See Krauskopf, Products Liability, 33 Mo. L. Rlv. 24 (1968); Rheingold, supra note 14, 22 Bus. LAw. at 593
n.15.
The language in the warranty cases use the term "manufacturer's intended
use," but the Missouri courts have used normally expected or foreseeable use as
synonymous with intended use, i.e., consumer expectations as to normal use.
Krauskopf, supra, at 33.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
32. Id., comment i.
33. Id., comments h & g.
34. Fischer, supra note 14, at 342 n.30 stated: "The Restatement does not
address itself to this question, but it is commonly held that under the Restatehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/11
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that the consumer's expectations as to safety could be frustrated if the
35
consumer knew of the danger.
Liability would be foreclosed under the consumer expectations test
if the consumer "misused" or "abnormally used" 3 6 the product. This
concept is explained in the Restatement:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from
abnormal handling, as where a bottle of beverage is knocked
against a radiator to remove the cap.
The seller is not li37
able.
Given this defense of misuse, the question becomes what sort of action
constitutes abnormal handling. In Blevins the court cited cases containing
the following language: "The statement to the effect defendants are not
liable for injuries resulting from abnormal use is only true if such abnormal use was not reasonably foreseeable. The issue is one of foreseeability, and misuse may be foreseeable." 3 8 Accordingly, misuse would be
an abnormal use that was not reasonably foreseeable by the manufac-

turer.39 A product's foreseeable uses may be very different from its

intended use and would include any particular use which should be
known to a reasonably prudent manufacturer. If it is determined that
the use was abnormal, the "defect" requirement would not be met and
the plaintiff would be denied recovery. Thus misuse negates characterization of the product as defective for purposes of imposing liability on
the manufacturer.
The Restatement test also requires that the product be "unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or consumer, 40 i.e., it must be "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary customer who purchases it with ordinary knowledge common to the com-

ment a warning is not required if the danger is obvious." E.g., Maas v. Dreher,
10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 291 (1970); Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 8 Ill. App. 3d
1038, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972). See Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate
Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274 (1969).
35. Fischer, supra note 14, at 349.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965).
37. Id. Missouri has included this normal use concept in the strict liability
instruction of the Missouri Approved Juy Instructions (MAI). Mo. APPROVED INSTR.
No. 25.04 (1969 ed.)
38. 551 S.W.2d at 607 (citing Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d
1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying Missouri law)); Higgins v. Paul Hardeman,
Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970). See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrY § 15.01 (1960).
39. Dunham v. Vaugham & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d, 315, 229
N.E.2d 684 (1967). Accord, Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.
1962).
40. See note 29 supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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munity as to its characteristics." 4 ' This consideration relates directly to
the underlying justification for imposing strict liability. Under mass marketing conditions, the consumer is induced to rely upon the suitability of
the chosen product for normal use. To the extent that the consumer
expects the danger, the product is "safe" for normal use 42 and therefore
not unreasonably dangerous. Use of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in this context is a reiteration of the consumer expectations
test.
The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement takes on a different
43
meaning when dealing with a product which is "unavoidably unsafe."
This type of product is one which, due to the present state of human
knowledge, is not capable of being made completely safe for its intended
use. 44 The Restatement excepts such products from the application of
strict liability; "such products are not 'defective' or 'unreasonably
dangerous' if marketing them is justified because their utility outweighs
the risk their use involves." 45 However, proper warning must be given
regarding the unsafe nature of the product, 4 6 and failure to do so would
render the product "reasonably dangerous." The Restatement provides
that a proper warning must be given if the manufacturer "has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
47
foresight should have knowledge of the present of ...the danger."
In discussing the unavoidably unsafe product, the Restatement uses
the "new drug" as an example, but this characterization could apply to
any product wherein the design is the cause of its unsafe nature. If the
design were as safe as the present state of human knowledge permitted,
the product were properly made, and a proper warning were given, the
product would not be defective. However, if the manufacturer were
negligent either in the propriety of the product's design or in the failure
to give a proper warning based on the knowledge available at the time of

41. However, Green, supra note 16, at 1210 stated:
The ordinary consumer, if there be such, or any other consumer expects the product he buys to be as represented. So the question in
any litigated case is not what was expected, but what the consumer
received and consumed. Thus, the litigated issue is limited to the
specific product and its condition when sold and when consumed.
There is no common denominator, either in consumer's or manufacturer's expectations that will serve as a standard for the determination of the quality of the product in a particular case.
42. "Safe" as used here does not necessarily mean safe per se but that the
product is to be deemed "safe" for purposes of imposing strict liability.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
44. Id. comment i.
45. Fischer, note 14 supra, at 343.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965).
47. Id. comment i.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/11
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manufacture, liability would attach.4 8 This aspect of the Restatement test,
involving the "unavoidably unsafe" product, introduces a requirement of
culpability on the part of the manufacturer as a condition precedent to
imposing strict liability. This requirement in effect reproduces the culpability requirement found in negligence theory.
The consumer expectations test has been criticized by the commentators. 49 It has been argued that expectations as to safety will not always
be in line with what the reasonable manufacturer can achieve, because
the average consumer will not have the same information as experts in,
the field. It is also stated that the modern trend is to extend the cause of
action to bystanders, 50 and that the rationale of the consumer expectations test does not apply in bystander cases.5 ,
In Blevins the Missouri court cited Oregon cases which have adopted
a different seller-oriented test of defectiveness, known as the WadeKeeton test. 52 This standard, as expressed by Dean Keeton, is that a
product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. The
product is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable seller knowing of the
risk of danger of the product and utilizing the scientific knowledge
available at the time of trial would not have marketed the product so
designed. 53 Under this test constructive knowledge of the defect is imputed to the manufacturer. The issue then becomes whether with this
knowledge a reasonable manufacturer would have marketed the product. This determination of reasonableness involves a risk-utility analysis
offered by Dean Wade. 5 4 The analysis involves weighing factors which
include the product's utility (the product's usefulness and the availability
of substitutes) against the product's risk (the product's safety, the manufacturer's ability to make the product safer, the user's ability to avoid
the danger resulting from use of the product, and the user's anticipated
awareness of the dangers involved).
Under the Wade-Keeton test, liability is also limited through the use
of the concept of "misuse." The concept is identical to that discussed in

48. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(failure to warn); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1973)(propriety of product's design).
49. Fischer, supra note 14 at 349; Green, supra note 16, at 1204; Keeton,
supra note 14, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. at 35; Wade, supra note 14, 44 Miss. L.J. at 833.
50. E.g., Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
51. Fischer, supra note 14, at 349-51.
52. 551 S.W.2d at 608 (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Ore.
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125
(1974).
53. Keeton, supra note 14, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. at 37. See Ross v. Up Right, Inc.,
402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis Ind., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d
841, 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1967). See also Wade, supra note 14,
19 Sw. L.J. at 15.
54. See note 16 supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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the consumer expectations test above, except that it is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded and proved by the manufacturer defendant. 5 5 This test is attractive, in light of the trend toward expanded
manufacturer liability, because the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of
proving the absence of misuse as an element of his case.
The difference between the consumer expectations test and the
Wade-Keeton test is that the focus in the latter is on the manufacturer
who has imputed knowledge of the defect, whereas the consumer expectations test focuses on the consumer and his expectations, except in
those cases involving an unavoidably unsafe product.
A recent Oregon decision 56 indicates that the state now uses the
Wade-Keeton test and 'the consumer expectations test in the conjunctive,
that is, both tests must'be satisfied for a finding of defectiveness. The
Oregon court defined "defective" using the Wade-Keeton standard, but
in discussing "misuse" defined it as "a use or handling so unusual that
the average consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be
designed and manufactured to withstand it-a use which the seller,
therefore, need not anticipate and provide for." 57 This test incorporates both standards-the article is defective only if a reasonable manufacturer with constructive knowledge of the defect would not have
marketed the product and the plaintiff did not use the product in such a
way that the average consumer c6uld not reasonably expect the product
to be safe. Adoption of this standard unnecessarily constricts the liability
of the manufacturer as the plaintiff mustatisfy a double burden. This
would be inconsistent with the general trend in the products liability
field and with Missouri decisions expanding manufacturers' liability exposure.
The courts first adopting the Wade-Keeton test in Texas 58 have recently adopted that test and the consumer expectations test in the disjunctive. In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins 59 the jury was instructed that
"defective" meant an "unreasonable risk of harm." "Unreasonable risk of
harm" meant either that the product as designed threatened harm to
persons using the product to an extent that any product so designed
would not be placed in the channels of commerce by a prudent manufacturer aware of the risks involed in its use, or that a product so manufactured would not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer as to its safety. 60 If Missouri courts accepted this test, strict
55. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
56. Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 509 P.2d 28 (Ore. 1973).
57. Id. at 31.
58. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974) (applying Texas law); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
59. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
60. Id. at 347 n.1.
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liability would be expanded to include those cases which would satisfy
either the consumer expectations test or the Wade-Keeton test. With
either test, the manufacturer would still retain the benefits of the limits
on liability noted earlier, i.e., the requirements of defectiveness and absence of "misuse."
By not clearly expressing one standard or the other, the Blevins
court could be said to have followed the California approach to "defectiveness." Two leading California cases 6 cited in Blevins reject the consumer expectations test because it "rings of negligence." 62 The California courts hold simply that a manufacturer is subject to strict liability in
tort if the plaintiff can prove that the article was defective and caused
the injury.6 3 The California Supreme Court has concluded that the
question of defectiveness is a question for the jury, and that the jury is
to decide the question without a more detailed standard on which to
base its analysis and ultimate determination. 64 This approach has been
criticized repeatedly. 65 By allowing the jury to determine "defectiveness" without judicial guidance, the policy considerations which lie behind the imposition of strict tort liability in the products area may be
ignored by the lay body without an understanding of their importance. 66 The expansive responsiblities and ramifications involved in im-

61. Cronin v. JBE Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970).
62. Cronin v. JBE Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 441 (1972); Dcnaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note
16, at 1305.
63. Cronin v. JBE Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 501 P.2d 1153, 1155, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972); Luque v. McLeon, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
64. The jurors are called upon to determine "defectiveness" by drawing on
their own common experiences as consumers and by using good sense.
65. Keeton, supra note 14, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. at 33 stated:
Seemingly the Supreme Court of California does not suggest
that those victimized by nondefective products would have a recovery, even when the product was used appropriately. It simply rejects
the notion that the product must be "unreasonably dangerous" to be
defective, and then substitutes nothing in the place of that notion to
give content to the term defective.
See Fischer, supra note 14, at 346; Wade, supra note 14, 44 Miss. L.J. at 830.
66. Fischer, supra note 14, at 359 listed policy considerations and factors
which are involved, in the imposition of strict liability:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protection measures
a. Knowledge of risk
b. Ability to control danger
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product
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posing strict liability on the manufacturer demand that some objective
and rational basis for determining that liability be developed.
The Missouri Supreme Court has permitted via Blevins the submission of design defect cases under a theory of strict liability in tort. This
decision is in accord with the trend in other jurisdictions6 7 and has been
supported by many of the commentators.6" The effect for the practitioner is uniformity in theories of liability in the products liability area;
cases may be submitted under one theory as opposed to pleading in the
alternative. In completing an effective transition to strict liability theory
in the design defect cases, the Missouri courts must make definitive the
standard of "defectiveness" to be used to make possible the utilization of
this theory of recovery without the confusion existing under the present
standard.
LELAND C. SMITH II

B. From point of view of manufacturer
1. Knowledge of risk
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses
3. Size of losses
4. Availability of insurance
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure
6. Effect of increased prices on industry
7. Public necessity for the product
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products
II. Safety Incentive

A. Likelihood of future product improvement
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken
C. Availability of safer products
67. See, e.g., Passwaters y. General Motors Corp. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.
1972); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969);
Juenger v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 286 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Ill. 1968); LaGorga v.
Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Finnegan v.
Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). See also Blevins v. Cushman Motors,
551 S.W.2d at 607.
68. See generally authorities cited note 14 supra.
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